tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post4409534164358727158..comments2023-01-24T10:06:57.212-08:00Comments on (Blog&~Blog): A Question About Truth And SetsBenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06702722560438833244noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post-21018320345125956492010-01-13T13:34:32.664-08:002010-01-13T13:34:32.664-08:00Yeah....interesting point. I agree that Field'...Yeah....interesting point. I agree that Field's paracomplete approach to paradoxes about properties in seem to be closely structurally parallel what gappy naive set theory would probably have to look like, but the issue is sort of complicated by the fact that he seems to be (somewhat strangely, to my way of thinking) content with ZFC-orthodoxy as a solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes, saying e.g on p. 384 of "Saving Truth From Paradox" that “the possibility that we should take a dialetheic attitude toward set theory itself” is “a possibility that Priest takes seriously but I suspect few of his readers will, and...in any case I am unwilling to..."<br /><br />Granted, to the extent that the sort of properties Field believes in are supposed to have categories of objects that have them and categories of objects that don't, and that this is the source of the problem, there's probably room for doubt about how much of the distinction he's appealing to is terminological--what we reserve the term 'set' for--and how much of it is philosophically substative.Benhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06702722560438833244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post-21279366296285998972010-01-13T08:07:44.361-08:002010-01-13T08:07:44.361-08:00Hartry Field might count, given his views on what ...Hartry Field might count, given his views on what he calls "conceptual property theory" expressed in 'Saving Truth'. I think his conception of conceptual properties is roughly the same thing as a gappy naive set theory.Colinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11764726376012276409noreply@blogger.com