tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post3329085123585164177..comments2023-01-24T10:06:57.212-08:00Comments on (Blog&~Blog): The Standard for Question-BeggingBenhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/06702722560438833244noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post-27132931483099291012008-08-10T11:31:00.000-07:002008-08-10T11:31:00.000-07:00I think I agree with you, or at least that's my in...I think I agree with you, or at least that's my instinct, but I think there is an issue here about how, when 'whether X is possible in principle' is the bone of contention, how starting from the assumption that it is can be less question-begging than starting from the assumption that it isn't. I think I agree that it is, I just don't know why.Benhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/06702722560438833244noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-2631035637795172582.post-8342976152426786592008-08-07T20:03:00.000-07:002008-08-07T20:03:00.000-07:00Tricky question. It seems like the general shape o...Tricky question. It seems like the general shape of any debate, including this, is to take some theoretical options and try to figure out which is the best. This sounds to me like it requires conceiving of each of the competitor theories as possibly true in some sense of 'possibility'. If this much is right, then we can draw the following lesson about the nature of the debate. If a part of the X theory is that the Y theory is not a conceptual possibility, then the sense in which we are holding the Y theory as a dialectical option must be some sense of 'possibility' broader than the 'conceptual' variety. Aaron Cotnoir (http://cotnoir.wordpress.com/) has a nice paper on this for-the-sake-of-argument broad sense of 'possibility' but I can't find it online right now.Colinhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/11764726376012276409noreply@blogger.com